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Abstract
Using data for banks from 65 countries for the period 2001–2013, we investigate the impact 
of bank regulation and supervision on individual banks’ systemic risk. Our cross-country 
empirical findings show that bank activity restriction, initial capital stringency and prompt 
corrective action are all positively related to systemic risk, measured by Marginal Expected 
Shortfall. We use the staggered timing of the implementation of Basel II regulation across 
countries as an exogenous event and use latitude for instrumental variable analysis to alle-
viate the endogeneity concern. Our results also hold for various robustness tests. We fur-
ther find that the level of equity banks can alleviate such effect, while bank size is likely to 
enhance the effect, supporting our conjecture that the impact of bank regulation and super-
vision on systemic risk is through bank’s capital shortfall. Our results do not argue against 
bank regulation, but rather focus on the design and implementation of regulation.
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1 Introduction
The inappropriate regulations and ineffective monitoring and supervision by official agen-
cies have been regarded as a critical cause of the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 
(Goodhart 2008; Schwarcz 2008; Acharya 2009; Laeven and Levine 2009). For example, 
Acharya (2009) argue that Basel regulations require banks to hold a certain ratio of capital 
to reduce individual banks’ liquidity risk but overlook the correlated risk banks take which 
can lead to joint failures. Despite the increasing calls for renewed focus on systemic stabil-
ity and macro-prudential regulation (e.g. Acharya et al. 2012), our understanding of how 
bank regulation and supervision affect systemic stability tends to be very limited (Arnold 
et al. 2012; Barth et al. 2013b).
A few studies have examined the impact of bank regulation and/or supervision on sys-
temic stability (e.g., Anginer et  al. 2018; Barth et  al. 2004; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detra-
giache 2002, 2011). Based on bank regulation data from the World Bank Survey, Barth 
et al. (2004) find that banks operating in countries with higher regulatory restriction are 
more likely to experience a banking crisis. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011), on the 
other hand, fail to find relationship between the adherence to the Basel core principles and 
systemic risk measured by a system-wide Z-score. However, there is a lack of evidence on 
how the current bank regulatory system affects individual banks’ exposure to the systemic 
risk. Our paper thus attempts to fill this gap in the literature.
Bank regulation comprises two main aspects, capital regulation and supervision, and 
restrictions on non-banking activities. In this paper we argue that both aspects of bank 
regulation may be positively related to bank’s exposure to systemic risk. First, Acharya 
et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2017) define a bank’s level of systemic risk as its 
capital shortfall, where a more undercapitalized bank compared to its risk level (but not 
government required level) contributes more to the whole financial system’s (in)stability, 
conditional on severe distress in the entire system. In an environment of more stringent 
bank capital regulation and supervision, banks find it harder to raise capital when the entire 
system is undercapitalized (i.e. economy downturn or financial crisis), and hence are more 
likely to have capital shortfall. The higher probability of banks’ capital shortfall would 
increase the systemic instability of the country.
Second, the level of regulation stringency can limit the freedom of banks’ activities. 
With stricter regulation, banks will have less opportunity to engage in a wider range of 
non-traditional bank activities. Based on the portfolio theory, the combined cash flows 
from non-correlated revenue sources should be more stable than the constituent parts 
(Baele et al. 2007). In other words, banks who are able to engage in different business lines 
tend to have more stable revenue flows compared to their peers and are thereby less likely 
to have capital shortfall when external shock happens. In addition, banks who are allowed 
to engage in broader activities are more able to raise capital from different sources, which 
therefore lowers their likelihood of experiencing capital shortfall. Similarly, when banks 
are only allowed to engage in limited activities, they are more likely to share a similar busi-
ness structure, and such similarity in banks’ business lines could result in lower systemic 
stability (Allen et al. 2012).
In order to investigate the impact of bank regulation on systemic risk, we use the new 
database by Barth et  al. (2013a) on bank regulation and supervision for more than 180 
countries over the period 1999–2011. Following Laeven and Levine (2009) and Li et al. 
(2019), we consider four aspects of bank regulation, including regulation on bank activities 
restriction, initial capital stringency, deposit insurer power and prompt corrective action. 
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Employing the factor analysis, we reduce the four regulation and supervision measures 
and construct a single measure of bank regulation stringency. We use Marginal Expected 
Shortfall (MES), developed by Acharya et al. (2017), as our main systemic risk measure.
We find that bank activity restriction, initial capital stringency and prompt corrective 
action are positively related to systemic risk. Such positive association is also found for the 
total regulation index we developed. This is consistent with our expectation based on the 
definition of systemic risk adopted in our study, suggesting that banks operating in coun-
tries with more stringent regulation and supervision appear to suffer from higher exposure 
to systemic risk. To alleviate the concern of endogeneity, we first employ the staggered tim-
ing of the implementation of Basel II regulation across countries to identify the changes in 
bank regulation. The results show that the implementation of Basel II increases the bank’s 
systemic risk more than those countries which have not yet implemented the capital regula-
tion, while there is no such a trend before the implementation. We also employ country’s 
latitude as an instrumental variable and conduct two-stage least squares regression analysis 
for causality referencing, and the same results are observed for the instrumental variable 
regression analysis. Our findings hold robust after using alternative measure of systemic 
risk (Brownlees and Engle 2017, SRISK) and variables of a country’s institutional quality 
indexes, as well as employing the weighted-least-square regression analysis to account for 
the differences in the number of banks across countries.
We then provide further evidence on our conjecture that the impact of bank regulation 
on systemic risk is through bank’s capital shortfall. We would expect this impact to be 
more intensified if the bank is more likely to experience capital shortfall when in distressed 
period, and vice versa. Specifically, we posit that the positive impact of bank regulation on 
systemic risk will be reduced if the bank holds a higher level of capital and if the bank has 
more diversified revenue flows. We thus introduce two interaction terms of our main regu-
lation measures with bank equity to assets ratio and diversification (measured by non-inter-
est income to total operation income, respectively), and include them in the main regres-
sions. Our results confirm the hypotheses indicated above.
Our findings do not suggest that bank regulation and supervision are detrimental to sys-
temic stability, but instead call for the proper design and implementation of bank regula-
tion. Literature on regulatory forbearance points out that policy makers’ control strategy 
tends to be influenced by strong political forces (e.g., Kane 1980). The global financial cri-
sis has drawn much attention and critiques from the government and public to the banking 
sector, imposing considerable political forces to the banking regulators and supervisors. As 
a response, increasing level of bank regulation stringency has been implemented in differ-
ent countries. However, whether bank regulatory and supervision rules could effectively 
address the concerns raised by the market and public appears to be unclear due to limited 
empirical evidence. This paper aims to empirically test the impact of bank regulation on 
systemic risk based on cross-country evidence and has important policy implications. We 
contribute to the literature in several ways.
First, the extant literature on bank regulation paid little attention to its impact on sys-
temic risk. Although a few empirical studies have examined this relationship, the measures 
of systemic risk they used appear to be limited at the country level (Hoque et al. 2015). 
Our paper contributes to the literature in this regard, examining the impact of bank regula-
tion on individual banks’ exposure to the overall systemic risk and providing important 
evidence. Our findings suggest that the increased similarity in the banking system due to 
the restrictions on non-banking activities would increase systemic risk. This is consist-
ent with the recent theoretical work on financial stability that highlights the importance 
of diversity in banking (Wagner 2010, 2011; Allen et al. 2012), showing that some degree 
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of diversification in banks’ asset portfolios is socially optimal so that banks do not have to 
liquidate their identical assets at the same time when financial shocks happen and generate 
a fire-sale externality that lowers welfare. Our results also highlight the importance of bank 
regulation in allowing banks more capability to raise capital when the whole system is 
undercapitalized. This is consistent with the recent changes to Basel III regulation, which 
promote the build-up of buffers in good times that can be drawn down in periods of stress. 
Although our paper does not directly test the effect of government capital injection to the 
financial system during crisis periods, the implication of our results is supportive of gov-
ernment action to reduce the capital shortfall of the banking system. This is also consistent 
with the empirical evidence provided by Berger et al. (2019) that the U.S. Troubled Assets 
Relief Program (TARP) significantly reduced banks’ contributions to systemic risk.
Second, our paper contributes to the recent emphasis on the determinants of bank sys-
temic risk. Existing literature has found that bank systemic risk is affected by the degree 
of competition (Anginer et  al. 2014a), consolidation (Weiß et  al. 2014), the structure of 
the financial network (Acemoglu et al. 2015), bank diversification (Yang et al. 2020), bank 
size and their capital level (Laeven et al. 2016). For example, Acemoglu et al. (2015) argue 
that the structure of the financial network is a determinant of systemic risk, with more 
diversified patterns of interbank liabilities leading to less fragility when the negative shock 
is below a critical threshold and vice versa. Laeven et al. (2016) show that systemic risk 
increases with bank size, but the systemic risk is significantly lower for well-capitalized 
banks. Although their work does not focus on the effect of regulation or supervision on 
bank systemic risk, it highlights the importance of appropriately designed regulation. Our 
paper provides further evidence in support of these arguments, showing that the regula-
tory and supervisory environment in which banks operate has significant impact on their 
systemic risk.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Our data, variables and descriptive 
statistics are presented in Sect. 2. Section 3 discusses the main results of our analyses, and 
Sect. 4 concludes the paper.
2  Data, variables and descriptive statistics
2.1  Data and sample
The dataset used in this study is compiled from several sources. First, we obtain bank 
level financial information from Datastream. Second, the data of banking regulation and 
supervision are selected from the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey database of 
the World Bank. This database is developed by Barth et al. (2013a) based on four world-
wide surveys they completed before.1 Following Barth et al. (2013b) and Li et al. (2019), 
we use the Survey I information for the value of the regulatory and supervisor variables 
for the year 2001, Survey II data for the period 2002–2004, Survey III data for the period 
2005–2008 and Survey IV data for the period 2009–2013. Third, in order to measure the 
systemic risk, we collect the daily stock returns data from Compustat. Fourth, we obtain 
1 Survey I was completed in 1999 and covered 118 countries; Survey II provided information on bank reg-
ulatory and supervisory policies in 151 countries for 2002; Survey III captured information on banking 
policies in 2006 for 142 countries; and Survey IV provided information in 125 countries for 2011 (Barth 
et al. 2013a).
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economic development measures from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator 
(WDI) database.
We then match bank-level information, information about regulation and supervision in 
different countries and other national data based on data availability. Because of the incom-
plete overlap among the three datasets, there are a significant number of missing data and 
the final sample used in our study contains 6305 observations, including banks from 65 
countries over the sample period of 2001–2013. It should be noted that the observations in 
our sample appear to be unbalanced and we attempt to address this concern in the robust-
ness test.
2.2  Variables of bank regulation and supervision
We are concerned with four types of regulation and supervision: restriction on bank 
activities, initial capital stringency, prompt corrective action and deposit insurer power. 
Variables are defined following the work of Barth et al. (2004) and Barth et al. (2013b).2 
Restriction on bank activities captures the extent to which the regulatory bodies in each 
county authorise banks to conduct activities in three areas of services (i.e. securities, insur-
ance and real estate). Initial capital stringency measures whether certain funds may be used 
to initially capitalize a bank and whether they are official. Prompt corrective action is used 
to measure whether supervisors in a country have the requisite and suitable powers to force 
automatic enforcement actions based on pre-determined levels of bank solvency deteriora-
tion. Deposit insurer power is an index used to measure each country’s deposit insurance 
regime and evolution during the period of 1999–201. The four variables of regulation and 
supervision are constructed based on certain survey question. Each of them ranges from 0 
to 1, with higher value indicating greater restrictions. Detailed information about the con-
struction of each variable can be found in “Appendix 1”.
Based on the above four measures of specific types of bank regulation and supervision, 
we develop a single regulation measure using factor analysis. Specifically, we employ the 
following equation:
where i, s, and t denote for countries, the four regulation variables and years, respectively. 
Yi,s,t is the value of four regulation measures, Regulation is the observation on the common 
factor, and  is the factor loadings. Next, we normalize variable Yi,s,t, to have a mean of 
zero and a variance of one. Following the Eq. (1), we estimate the factors ( Regulationist ) 
and their loadings
i
 . The results shows that around 52% of variance for the variable are 
explained by the common factors. We use the factor with greatest explanatory power as our 
measure of total regulation, where larger value indicates greater stringency.
2.3  Measure of systemic risk
Following Acharya et al. (2017), our study adopts the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) 
as the measure for determining the systemic risk exposure of individual banks. The 
(1)Yi,s,t = iRegulationi,s,t + i,t
2 Detailed information about variable definition, including the specific survey questions used and how the 
variables are constructed, can be found in “Appendix 1”. We only define the variables briefly in this sub-
section.
 L. Chen et al.
1 3
systemic expected shortfall of an institution describes the capital shortage a financial insti-
tution would experience when there is a systemic event. The capital shortfall depends on 
the institution’s leverage and equity loss conditional on an aggregate market decline. Mar-
ginal Expected Shortfall (MES) of a financial institution is the expected loss to which an 
equity investor in a financial institution would be exposed if the systemic declined substan-
tially. Following Acharya et al. (2017), we adopt MES as our systemic risk measure. MES 
evaluates the average daily return for the market as whole in the tail of its loss distribution:
R
i
t
 is the equity return of financial firm i , and Rm
t
 is the aggregate market index return. A 
systemic event is defined as a drop of the market index below a threshold, C , over a given 
time horizon. We estimate the MES by following Acharya et al. (2017) at a standard risk 
level of 5%, using daily data for equity return from Datastream. For better interpretation of 
our results, we take the negative value of MES to ensure that our measures are increasing 
in systemic risk.
2.4  Other control variables
We control for a set of bank-specific and country-specific variables in the regression anal-
ysis, including bank size, profitability, market-to-book value, loan loss provision, GDP 
growth, inflation and economic freedom, which have been used in some previous studies 
of bank regulation and risk (Barth et  al. 2004; Delis et  al. 2011; Anginer et  al. 2014a). 
For example, Anginer et  al. (2014a) find that larger banks pose greater systemic risk, 
while banks with higher market-to-book value tend to have lower systemic risk exposure. 
Nijskens and Wagner (2011) find that banks with higher ROA tend to use CDS to pro-
tect against defaults on their portfolios, and this helps to decrease individual risk, while 
increasing the joint risks.
Bank size is measured by the natural logarithm of individual bank’s total assets. We 
use return on average assets (ROAA) to capture the profitability of banks, and market-to-
book value (MTBV) to control for bank growth opportunities. Loan loss provisioning is an 
accounting indicator that directly influences the volatility and cyclicality of bank earnings, 
as well as information properties of banks’ financial reports with respect to reflecting loan 
portfolios’ risk attributes (Bushman and Williams 2012).
With regard to the country-level factors, GDP growth is the annual growth rate of GDP, 
and inflation is defined as the percentage change of GDP deflator. Following Li et  al. 
(2019), we derive the variable of Economic Freedom from the Heritage Foundation. It is 
the mean value of an index of economic freedom in terms of trade freedom, business free-
dom, investment freedom, and property rights for the period 2001–2013. The Economic 
Freedom measures the extent to which individuals and firms can enjoy freedom from their 
governments in conducting their business. All variable definitions can be found in “Appen-
dix 2”.
(2)MES
i
t
= E
(
R
i
t
|Rm
t
< C
)
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Table 1  Summary statistics for the regulation variables
Country N Activity 
restriction
Initial capital 
stringency
Prompt cor-
rective action
Deposit 
insurer 
power
Regulation total
Argentina 71 0.418 0.531 0.511 0.707 0.564
Australia 127 0.445 0.780 0.880 0.139 0.633
Austria 108 0.468 0.441 0.674 0.0540 0.446
Bahrain 75 0.613 0.489 0.849 0.0889 0.600
Bangladesh 115 0.470 0.333 0.964 0.464 0.619
Belgium 20 0.394 0.583 0.825 0.300 0.571
Botswana 15 0.438 0.333 0.800 0 0.427
Brazil 124 0.573 0.543 0.867 0 0.580
Bulgaria 13 0.466 0.333 0.554 0.231 0.417
Canada 129 0.532 0.793 0.407 0.616 0.642
Chile 81 0.610 0.309 0.747 0.208 0.538
China 13 0.692 0.0256 0.808 0 0.456
Colombia 53 0.568 0.509 0.594 0.160 0.516
Croatia 44 0.607 0 0.598 0.333 0.422
Cyprus 25 0.532 0.333 0.920 0 0.514
Czech 11 0.409 0.485 0.530 0.561 0.514
Denmark 231 0.341 0.766 0.561 0.181 0.481
Ecuador 16 0.500 0.667 0.600 0.167 0.536
Egypt 99 0.383 0.316 0.899 0.167 0.472
Finland 28 0.536 0.869 0.286 0.0536 0.479
France 361 0.386 0.695 0.554 0.391 0.533
Germany 248 0.150 0.536 0.502 0.490 0.378
Greece 58 0.444 0.833 0.604 0.0144 0.523
Hong Kong SAR 70 0.584 0.505 0.821 0.124 0.590
Hungary 17 0.548 0.431 0.941 0.176 0.605
Iceland 14 0.554 0.190 0.381 0.119 0.326
India 380 0.434 0.344 0.781 0.0158 0.426
Indonesia 150 0.714 0.333 0.988 0.341 0.713
Ireland 13 0.462 0.333 0.769 0.167 0.471
Israel 91 0.420 0.667 0.799 0.0440 0.534
Italy 301 0.509 0.762 0.328 0.203 0.486
Japan 875 0.484 0.623 0.939 0.0838 0.609
Jordan 106 0.352 0.333 0.628 0 0.327
Kazakhstan 8 0 0 0.800 0 0.113
Kenya 33 0.625 0.859 0.885 0.621 0.872
Kuwait 166 0.667 0.333 0.509 0 0.438
Lebanon 33 0.616 0.333 0.770 0.212 0.558
Lithuania 13 0.688 0.667 0.723 0.590 0.778
Luxembourg 23 0.283 0.667 0.804 0.0362 0.467
Malaysia 139 0.249 0.667 0.622 0.157 0.420
Malta 20 0.406 0.833 0.900 0.0833 0.624
Mexico 74 0.429 0.802 0.786 0.273 0.635
Morocco 68 0.413 0.647 0.831 0.0662 0.541
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2.5  Descriptive statistics
Table 1 summarises the mean value for the regulation variables in each country during the 
sample period 2001–2013.3 We observe a wide variation in the four specific regulation meas-
ures and also the total regulation index. Activity Restriction varies from the lowest value of 
zero in Kazakhstan and of 0.15 in Germany to a high value of 0.692 in China and of 0.714 in 
Indonesia, indicating that Indonesia and China forbid banks from engaging in most non-bank 
activities, while banks in Germany and Kazakhstan have relatively more freedom to extend 
their operations into securities, insurance or real estate markets. Finland has the highest Initial 
Table 1  (continued)
Country N Activity 
restriction
Initial capital 
stringency
Prompt cor-
rective action
Deposit 
insurer 
power
Regulation total
Niger 6 0.542 0.389 0.611 0 0.430
Nigeria 20 0.625 0.333 0.800 0.333 0.604
Norway 201 0.428 0.333 0.477 0.558 0.457
Oman 23 0.435 0.667 0.696 0.0580 0.509
Pakistan 173 0.413 0.541 0.910 0 0.518
Panama 2 0.563 0.333 1 0 0.556
Peru 68 0.479 0.711 0.708 0.206 0.587
Poland 159 0.307 0.667 0.642 0 0.414
Portugal 47 0.431 0.695 0.706 0.0426 0.516
Qatar 34 0.463 0.333 0.765 0 0.427
Russian 8 0.656 0.667 0.550 0.167 0.594
Singapore 38 0.257 0.675 0.654 0.0746 0.416
Slovakia 33 0.419 0.798 1 0.232 0.692
South Africa 23 0.688 0.667 0.400 0 0.515
Spain 94 0.328 0.397 0.555 0.291 0.386
Sri Lanka 109 0.636 0.538 0.583 0 0.513
Sweden 41 0.329 0.561 0.167 0.0610 0.245
Switzerland 235 0.609 0.694 0.792 0.294 0.695
Thailand 163 0.248 0.444 0.803 0.0542 0.386
Tunisia 56 0.375 0 0.600 0 0.225
Venezuela 109 0.398 0.502 0.811 0.0734 0.483
Zimbabwe 4 0.625 0.667 0.800 0.167 0.665
Total 6305 0.450 0.554 0.708 0.183 0.518
This table includes the countries that are included in our study. Column N represents the number of obser-
vations from this country in the sample period 2001–2013. The remainder of the table reports the mean 
figures (in percentage form) of the regulation variables over the sample period for each country. A detailed 
description of the definitions of the variables is included in “Appendix 1”
3 We exclude banks in the US and UK from our main analysis because the large number of banks in the 
two countries would have overrepresented the sample if they were included (about one third observation of 
the whole sample). However, we re-estimate the baseline regression by including US and UK banks and the 
results are reported in “Appendix 2”. Our baseline results still hold.
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Capital Stringency, with a value of 0.869, while the mean value of Initial Capital Stringency 
in Kazakhstan, Tunisia and Croatia are equal to zero, representing that banks in these three 
countries can include assets other than cash or government securities and borrowed funds as 
regulatory capital. With respect to Prompt Corrective Action, Panama and Slovakia have the 
highest mean value of 1, while Sweden has the lowest value of 0.167. Deposit Insurer Power 
varies from the lowest value of zero in fifteen countries, mainly developing countries such as 
Brazil, China, Jordan, Pakistan, and South Africa and etc., to the highest value of 0.707 in 
Argentina. Among the sample countries, Kenya has the highest Total Regulation Index value 
(0.872), while Kazakhstan has the lowest (0.113).
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistic and correlation analysis for the variables of sys-
temic risk, regulation, bank-specific and country-specific factors for the entire sample. In 
panel A, we report the summary statistics for all the variables we used in our baseline analysis. 
We observe a wide variation in the systemic risk measure for the sample banks over the period 
of 2001 to 2013, with a mean value 0.992 and standard deviation 1.140.
The mean value of the Activity Restriction variable is 0.45, showing that the average level 
of restriction on bank activities is medium. Banks on average have a value of 0.554 for Initial 
Capital Stringency, suggesting that more than half of the banks in the sample can include 
funds other than cash, government securities and borrowed funds as regulatory capital. The 
Prompt Corrective Action variable shows a mean value of 0.708, indicating that on average the 
supervision power is high in the sample banks. However, the power of deposit insurer in most 
countries appears to be limited as the average value of Deposit Insurer Power is only 0.183.
In terms of control variables, the average of Market-to-book-value (MTBV) is 1.398, rang-
ing from 25th percentile of 0.760 to 75th percentile of 1.750. We use the natural logarithm of 
total assets to measure the size of the banks. On average, the logarithm value of total assets is 
9.322, with a standard deviation of 2.389. We observe a large variation in the LLP variable, 
with an average value of 0.233% and standard deviation of 2.973. The value at 25th percentile 
is 0.0488% while it reaches to 0.271% at 75th percentile. GDP growth and Inflation reports the 
mean value as 2.970 and 4.263 respectively. The Economic Freedom Index presents signifi-
cant variation from 59.20 (25th percentile) to 70.90 (75th percentile), with 65.35 on average.
In panel B, we report the Pearson correlations for the variables used in this paper. We find 
that regulation stringency tends to be positively related to systemic risk. Furthermore, we 
observe that countries with greater regulation and supervision stringency tend to have lower 
GDP growth, higher inflation but more economic freedom, and banks operating in these coun-
tries tend to be larger but have lower market-to-book value. We will explore the relation more 
rigorously in later multivariate analysis.
3  Empirical results
3.1  Baseline results
We start with five baseline models using OLS to examine the association between bank regu-
lation and systemic risk. More specifically, we estimate the following equation:
The dependent variable is the systemic risk measured by MES of bank i in country j in 
year t. The main independent variable is the regulation variables, namely Activity Restric-
tion, Initial Capital Stringency, Prompt Corrective Action, Deposit Insurer Power and the 
(3)MESijt =  +  × regulationsjt + Ω × bank and country controlsijt + i + t + ijt
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Table 2  Descriptive statistics and correlation analyses
Variable N Mean Standard deviation 25th Medium 75th
Panel A: summary statistics
MES 6305 0.992 1.140 0.0959 0.751 1.640
Activity restriction 6305 0.450 0.222 0.313 0.438 0.563
Initial capital stringency 6305 0.554 0.241 0.333 0.667 0.667
Prompt corrective action 6305 0.708 0.263 0.500 0.800 1
Deposit insurer power 6305 0.183 0.244 0 0 0.333
Regulation total 6305 0.518 0.178 0.395 0.526 0.673
MTBV 6305 1.398 0.980 0.760 1.160 1.750
LgTA 6305 9.322 2.389 7.632 9.153 10.96
LLP 6305 0.233 2.973 0.0488 0.140 0.271
ROAA 6305 1.005 4.516 0.320 0.830 1.600
GDP growth 6305 2.970 3.702 1.136 2.587 5.278
Inflation 6305 4.263 6.348 0.795 2.555 6.387
Economic freedom 6305 65.35 8.882 59.20 64.90 70.90
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Panel B: correlation matrix
(1) MES 1
(2) Activity 
restriction
0 1
(3) Initial capital 
stringency
0.027** 0.01 1
(4) Prompt correc-
tive action
0.139*** 0.189*** 0.034*** 1
(5) Deposit insuer 
power
− 0.072*** − 0.047*** 0.077*** − 0.162*** 1
(6) Regulation 
total
0.056*** 0.683*** 0.474*** 0.576*** 0.278*** 1
(7) MTBV 0.094*** − 0.042*** − 0.061*** − 0.058*** 0.014 − 0.076*** 1
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Table 2  (continued)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
(8) lgTA 0.167*** 0.058*** − 0.062*** 0.025** 0.085*** 0.052*** 0.090*** 1
(9) LLP − 0.024* − 0.004 − 0.016 0.001 − 0.020* − 0.016 − 0.012 0.025** 1
(10) ROA − 0.073*** − 0.028** − 0.012 − 0.016 0.013 − 0.026** 0.019 − 0.016 − 0.303*** 1
(11) GDP Growth − 0.048*** − 0.075*** − 0.216*** 0.070*** − 0.068*** − 0.125*** 0.149*** 0.125*** − 0.01 0.109*** 1
(12) Inflation − 0.116*** 0.018 − 0.252*** − 0.036*** − 0.02 − 0.121*** 0.093*** 0.116*** 0.009 0.119*** 0.216*** 1
(13) Economic 
Freedom
0.029** 0.033*** 0.248*** − 0.038*** 0.081*** 0.135*** − 0.006 − 0.155*** − 0.006 − 0.068*** − 0.269*** − 0.468*** 1
This table provides the summary statistics for the variables of the regulation, bank-specific and country-specific variables used in baseline analysis over the sample period of 
2001–2013. The sample consists of 6305 banks across 65 countries. The variables are defined as outlined in “Appendix 1”. N denotes the number of observations
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Total Regulation Index, respectively. Control variables include bank-level and country-
level variables since these factors could potentially affect systemic risk. 
i
 is bank fixed 
effects to control time invariant bank heterogeneity and 
t
 is calendar year fixed effects. 
The standard errors for the regressions are estimated as heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered for banks and presented in brackets. Table 3 reports the results.
We find a positive relationship between the majority of regulation stringency variables 
(Activity Restriction, Initial Capital Stringency, Prompt Corrective Action and Regulation 
Total) and systemic risk. In column (1), we observe a positive relation between Activity 
Restriction and MES, suggesting that banks in countries with tough activity restriction are 
exposed to higher systemic risk. Traditional portfolio theory predicts that the combined 
cash flows from non-correlated revenue sources should be more stable than the constitu-
ent parts (Baele et  al. 2007). Activity restrictions may result in herding behavior and 
greater correlated risk taking (Anginer et al. 2014a), as the structure of bank portfolios will 
Table 3  Baseline results
This table reports the panel regression results of the estimation of different regulations and systemic risk 
from 65 countries for the period from 2001 to 2013. The dependent variable is the systemic risk measure by 
MES. Control variables include MTBV, lgTA, LLP, ROAA, GDP Growth, Inflation and Economic Freedom. 
Detailed definitions of the variables can be found in “Appendix 1”. Bank fixed effect and year fixed effects 
are both included. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated as heteroskedasticity-robust stand-
ard errors clustered for banks and are presented in brackets *, **, and *** represent statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Activity restriction Initial 
capital 
stringency
Prompt 
corrective 
action
Deposit insurer 
power
Regulation total
Regulation 0.204** 0.361*** 0.200*** − 0.093 0.419***
(0.091) (0.081) (0.077) (0.062) (0.105)
MTBV 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.076*** 0.071*** 0.076***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
lgTA − 0.110** − 0.113** − 0.108** − 0.128*** − 0.090**
(0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
LLP − 0.010* − 0.010* − 0.010* − 0.010* − 0.010*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
ROAA − 0.002 − 0.002 − 0.003 − 0.003 − 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
GDP growth 0.006* 0.004 0.006* 0.005 0.006*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Inflation − 0.001 − 0.001 − 0.001 − 0.002 − 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Economic freedom 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
_cons 1.335** 1.323** 1.292** 1.629*** 1.051*
(0.598) (0.590) (0.595) (0.589) (0.595)
Bank-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6305 6305 6305 6305 6305
Adj. R-sq 0.267 0.270 0.268 0.267 0.269
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become more similar and risks are highly correlated among those banks. Wagner (2010) 
argues that diversification in banks’ activities can reduce systemic risk and increase wel-
fare, while similarity cannot. Less restriction on bank activities allows banks to engage in a 
broad range of activities, which has the potential to decrease conglomerate risk (Kwan and 
Laderman 1999). Our results provide evidence to support the above arguments. This is also 
consistent with findings of previous empirical work. Based a country-level database to ana-
lyse the influence of bank activity restrictions on the likelihood of a banking crisis, Barth 
et al. (2004) find that greater regulatory restrictions on bank activities are associated with 
an increase in the likelihood of suffering a major crisis. Beck et al. (2006) show that impos-
ing fewer restrictions on bank activities can reduce banking system fragility.
Similarly, we find a significantly positive association between Initial Capital Stringency 
and systemic risk in column (2). Capital requirement has been one of the most important 
bank regulatory instruments under the work of the Basel Committee of Banking Supervi-
sion. Capital, as a buffer for losses in bad times and also an incentive adjustor, is likely 
to reduce the principal-agent problem between shareholders and debt-holders and prevent 
excessive risk taking (Chortareas et al. 2012; Ellis et al. 2014; Pasiouras et al. 2006). In 
this sense, better capitalized banks seem to contribute less to systemic risk (Laeven et al. 
2016).
However, if systemic risk is defined as capital shortfall of individual bank when the 
whole financial system is under distress, greater capital stringency may lead to increased 
systemic risk as it can create challenges for banks, especially in the crisis time. When the 
system is undercapitalized, it will no longer supply credit for the routine business. Banks 
under greater capital stringency will find more difficult to raise capital, and hence will be 
more likely to experience capital shortfall and exposure to greater systemic instability. 
Moreover, stringent regulation design in banking can cause the boundary problem (Good-
hart 2008). If regulations are asymmetric between the banking industry and other finan-
cial sectors, such as the insurance sector, banks will be tempted to engage in regulatory 
arbitrage which could conceivably lead to an increase in overall systemic risk (Allen and 
Gale 2007). Therefore, it is not surprising that a positive association between Initial Capi-
tal Stringency and systemic risk is found in this study, suggesting that banks under greater 
initial capital stringency tend to have higher systemic risk.
Our results in Column (3) show that the enhanced Prompt Corrective Power can also 
contribute negatively to the financial stability of the market in the sample countries. There 
are strong theoretical explanations arguing for greater official supervision power. Banks 
are difficult to monitor, especially for the debtholders who are not in a position to moni-
tor managers because they are small and uninformed (Dewatripont and Tirole 1993; San-
tos 2001). From this perspective, a strong official supervision can monitor and discipline 
banks, prevent managers from excessive risk-taking behaviour, and thus reduce market fail-
ure (Beck et al. 2006).
However, such an argument is based on the assumption that the supervisory agencies 
are acting according to public interest. Under the private interest or regulatory capture 
view (Barth et  al. 2004; Agoraki et  al. 2011), governments and supervisors may act 
in the interest of a few specific groups, e.g. powerful banks, rather than the society. 
If this held true then a stronger supervisory power might actually have uncertain and 
even adverse implications for bank’s lending behaviour (Beck et al. 2006; Agoraki et al. 
2011). In the study by Barth et al. (2004), no significant association is found between 
official supervisory power and the likelihood of suffering a crisis. Greater government 
intervention may also undermine the self-regulation faction in the banking system and 
increase moral hazard due to a decline in market discipline (Gropp and Vesala 2004; 
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Hryckiewicz 2014). Hryckiewicz (2014) investigates the impact of policy injections into 
banks in 23 countries during the 2007–2009 financial crisis, and finds that government 
interventions are strongly correlated with subsequent risk increase in the bank sector. 
He argues that the increased role of the government in the banking sector might encour-
age politicians to act in self-interests. Our results provide evidence to support the view 
of private interest, showing higher prompt corrective power leads to increased systemic 
risk.
Last, the coefficient for the Total Regulation Index shown in column (5) is significantly 
positive, consistent with the aforementioned results. All these results suggest that banks 
under strict regulation and supervision tend to have higher systemic risk. One potential rea-
son is that under more stringent regulation and supervision, banks will have more difficulty 
in raising capital and be more likely to experience capital shortfall.
The only regulation variable for which no significant relationship exists is Deposit 
Insurer Power. Following the establishment of the first national insurance system in the 
U.S. in 1934, explicit deposit insurance schemes to prevent widespread bank runs have 
been adopted in different countries since the 1980s (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
2002; Barth et  al. 2004). However, it has been widely recognised that deposit insurance 
can aggravate the moral hazard problem in the banking sector by encouraging excessive 
risk-taking behaviour (Barth et al. 2004; Bisias et al. 2012; Anginer et al. 2014b). Deposi-
tors can monitor bank risk-taking behaviour by charging higher interest rates, but they may 
have less incentive to monitor banks if deposits are insured, and the lack of market dis-
cipline is likely to result in excessive risk taking culminating in banking crises (Anginer 
et al. 2014b). The higher the individual risk, the greater the capital shortfall when banks 
are in distress, and consequently the more they contribute to systemic instability.
More empirical evidence tends to support this argument (e.g., Barth et al. 2004; Demir-
güç-Kunt and Detragiache 2002). For example, Barth et al. (2004) find a positive associa-
tion between the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and the possibility of suffering 
a major banking crisis, and such a relationship is economically large. More recently, Ang-
iner et al. (2014b) find that deposit insurance increases systemic fragility in the years lead-
ing to 2007–2009 financial crisis, but lower bank systemic risk in countries with deposit 
insurance coverage during crisis. Their findings suggest that the ‘‘moral hazard effect’’ 
of deposit insurance dominates in good times, while the ‘‘stabilization effect’’ of deposit 
insurance dominates in turbulent times. The cancelling effects of deposit insurance power 
in the sample countries may explain why there is no significant relationship found in our 
study.
In terms of control variables, the signs and significance levels of these variables are in 
line with our expectations. For bank specific characteristics, the coefficient on bank size 
(measured as logarithm of total assets) appears to be negatively and statistically significant 
in all regressions, indicating that larger banks are less likely to be exposed to higher sys-
temic risk. While the MTBV is positively relative to the systemic risk, which suggests that 
higher market valued banks are exposing to higher systemic risk. Besides, we find a weak 
evidence (statistically significant at 10% level across all models) showing that the LLP is 
negatively related to systemic risk, which suggests that banks with lower level of loan loss 
provision tend to be exposed to higher systemic risk.
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Table 4  Endogeneity test: Basel 
II implementation and systemic 
risk
This table reports the panel regression results of the estimation of dif-
ferent regulations and systemic risk from 65 countries for the period 
from 2001 to 2013. The dependent variable is the systemic risk meas-
ure by MES. Column (1) reports the results of estimation Basel II 
implementation and systemic risk. Basel II Dummy which equals to 
one for the time after the country adopted Basel II and 0 otherwise. 
Column (2) reports the dynamic change of systemic risk prior/after 
the Basel II implementation. Basel II
it
 is set to one for years prior/
after Basel II implementation and zero otherwise. Control variables 
include MTBV, lgTA, LLP, ROAA, GDP Growth Inflation and Eco-
nomic Freedom. Detailed definitions of the variables can be found 
in “Appendix 1”. Bank fixed effect and year fixed effects are both 
included. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated as het-
eroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks and are pre-
sented in brackets *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively
Dependent variable (1) (2)
MES MES
Basel II Dummy 0.175**
(0.085)
Basel II t − 4 − 0.275
(0.213)
Basel II t − 3 − 0.063
(0.177)
Basel II t − 2 − 0.074
(0.127)
Basel II t − 1 − 0.084
(0.090)
Basel II t + 1 0.281***
(0.094)
Basel II t + 2 0.269**
(0.131)
Basel II t + 3 0.478***
(0.170)
Basel II t + 4 0.484**
(0.215)
Basel II t + 5 0.781***
(0.265)
Basel II t + 6 0.999***
(0.314)
_cons 1.204* 1.061
(0.715) (0.787)
Control variables Yes Yes
Bank fixed effect Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes
N 4880 4880
Adj. R-sq 0.285 0.287
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3.2  Endogeneity tests
The results from our baseline regression analysis have documented a positive relation-
ship between regulation stringency and systemic risk. However, there might be concerns 
about endogeneity, such as reverse causality. For example, if policymakers or government 
observed that banks in their countries are exposing to a higher systemic risk, they would 
probably enforce more restrict regulatory and supervisory policies in the banking sector. In 
this section, we conduct analyses to address the potential endogeneity between bank regu-
lation and systemic risk.
3.2.1  Basel II implementation and systemic risk
First, we employ the staggered timing of the implementation of Basel II regulation across 
countries. Basel II was designed to improve the way that regulatory capital requirements 
Fig. 1  Basel II implementation and systemic risk: dynamic results. This figure presents 
the dynamic impact of Basel II implementation on systemic risk. The impact of Basel II on 
systemic risk is shown by the connected dots; the vertical bars correspond to 95% confidence 
intervals with bank-level clustered standard error. All estimates are relative to the year before 
Basel II implementation. Specifically, we report estimated coefficients from the following specifica-
tion: Y
it
=  + 
−4
Basel II
it−4
+ 
−3
Basel II
it−3
+ 
−2
Basel II
it−2
+ 
−1
Basel II
it−1
+ 
1
Basel II
it+1
+⋯
+
6
Basel IIit+6 + Ω × bank and country controlsijt + i + t + ijt . Where the BaselIIit equals to one 
in the years after the country in which bank is located implement the Basel II in year t  and zero other-
wise.Basel II
it−4
 is set to one for years up to and including 4 years prior to Basel II implementation and zero 
otherwise, Basel II
it+6
 set to one for years up to and including 6 years after Basel II implementation. The 
omitted variable in this regression is the year of Basel II implementation (t = 0). 
i
and 
t
 are bank and year 
fixed effects, respectively
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4 Basel II comprises three pillars: a) Minimum Capital Requirements, which seeks to develop and expand 
the standardised rules on the calculation of total minimum capital requirements for credit, market and oper-
ational risk; b) supervisory review process, which is intended to encourage banks to develop and use better 
risk management techniques in monitoring and managing their risks; c.) Market Discipline, which aims to 
promote effective use of disclosure as a lever to strengthen market discipline and encourage sound banking 
practices (Committee on Banking Supervision 2004).
5 Regression results for model (4) are reported in column (2) of Table 4.
could reflect underlying risks and address the financial innovation accrued in previous 
years.4 Following the release of Basel II in June 2004, different countries adopted this new 
framework at a staggered process. In our sample, Australia was the first country imple-
menting Basel II in 2005, followed by Japan, Brazil and other countries which imple-
mented it in 2007. This allows us to use countries that had not adopted it at a point of 
time to control for potentially confounding effects. We estimate the difference in systemic 
risk exposure of banks in a country before and after the Basel II implementation to such 
differences for banks in countries where Basel II has not been implemented during same 
time period. If strict regulation and supervision increases the individual banks’ exposure 
to systemic risk, we would expect an increase in systemic risk after the implementation 
of Basel II. We manually collect the time of individual countries implementing Basel II, 
and then introduce a dummy variable of Basel II, which equals to one for the time after the 
country adopted Basel II and 0 otherwise. The baseline regression was re-run by replacing 
the variable of  Regulationsi,t with Basel II Dummy. The result is reported in column (1) of 
Table 4.
As expected, the coefficient of Basel II Dummy is positive and significant at 95% con-
fidence level, showing that the adoption of Basel II is related to higher MES, which means 
the implementation of Basel II tends to increase systemic risk in a country.
Although the staggered adoption of Basel II represents an exogenous shock to bank reg-
ulation, country-level factors that manifest differently across countries could affect the tim-
ing of Basel II adoption in different countries. To ensure there is no trend before the event, 
we further examine the dynamic of the relation between Basel II implementation and bank 
systemic risk exposure by including a series of dummy variables in Eq. (3) to trace out the 
year-by-year effects of Basel II implementation on systemic risk. Specifically, we conduct 
analysis for the following Eq. (4):
where the the dynamic change of systemic equals to one in the years before (after) the 
country in which bank is located implement the Basel II in year t and zero otherwise. 
Basel II
it−4
 is set to one for years up to and including 4  years prior to Basel II imple-
mentation and zero otherwise; Basel II
it+6
 set to one for years up to and including 6 years 
after Basel II implementation. The omitted variable in this regression is the year of Basel 
II introduction (t = 0). Therefore, we can estimate the dynamic effect of Basel II imple-
mentation on systemic risk relative to the year of implementation. If there is an increas-
ing systemic risk simultaneously happened with the implementation of Basel II, we should 
observe a trend before and after the implementation of Basel II. Otherwise, the result 
derived from column (1) should not result from reverse causality.
Figure 1 plots the coefficients estimate of Basel II implementation and their associated 
95% confidence intervals as shown by the vertical bars of Eq. (4).5 Overall, we find that the 
coefficients on Basel II are insignificant for years before implementation except years up to 
(4)
Yit =  + −4Basel IIit−4 + −3Basel IIit−3 + −2Basel IIit−2 + −1Basel IIit−1
+ 
1
Basel IIit+1 +⋯ + 6Basel IIit+6 + Ω × bank and country controlsijt + i + t + ijt
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Table 5  Endogenous test: instrumental variables analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Activity restriction Initial capital stringency Prompt corrective 
action
Deposit insurer power Regulation total
Panel A: first stage
Latitude 0.496*** − 0.641*** − 0.336*** − 1.195*** − 0.387***
(0.111) (0.248) (0.108) (0.087) (0.077)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First stage F-test (p value) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Panel B: second stage
Regulation 0.412* 1.354* 1.061* 1.793* 0.536*
(0.224) (0.735) (0.576) (0.973) (0.291)
MTBV 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.086*** 0.078*** 0.075***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024)
lgTA − 0.125*** − 0.122*** − 0.123*** − 0.129*** − 0.125***
(0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.044)
LLP − 0.009* − 0.010* − 0.009* − 0.011* − 0.009*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
ROAA − 0.002 − 0.002 − 0.002 − 0.004 − 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
GDP Growth 0.007* 0.005 0.009** 0.002 0.006*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Inflation − 0.001 0.004 0.003 − 0.002 0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Economic freedom 0.005 0.009* 0.003 0.007 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
_cons 1.432*** 0.611 0.934** 1.322*** 1.322***
(0.538) (0.506) (0.471) (0.512) (0.512)
Bank-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5  (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Activity restriction Initial capital stringency Prompt corrective 
action
Deposit insurer power Regulation total
Time-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6305 6305 6305 6305 6305
Adj. R-sq 0.266 0.266 0.266 0.266 0.266
This table reports the two-stage least squares regression results of the estimation of different regulations and systemic risk from 65 countries for the period from 2001 to 2013. 
The dependent variable is the systemic risk measure by MES. Instrumental variables for bank regulations is latitude. We report both the first and second stage results. In the 
first stage regression, we regress bank regulation measures on the latitude of the country. In the second stage, we use the predicted value of bank regulation measures from the 
first stage as the independent variable. Panel A reports the corresponding first-stage regression results with endogenous variable bank regulation as dependent variable. Panel 
B reports the second-stage regression results from the 2SKS analysis. The independent variable is the systemic risk measured by MES. Bank-fixed effect and time-fixed effects 
are included. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated as heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks and are presented in brackets *, **, and *** 
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively
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and 4 years prior to implementation. We can confirm that there is no trend of systemic risk 
change prior to Basel II implementation. On the other side, we observe that the coefficients 
become significantly positive since the first and following years after Basel II implemented. 
Compared to that for first year after the implementation, the coefficients for the second year 
of implementation and afterwards almost double, indicating that implementation of Basel 
II has a positive impact on banks’ systemic risk.
3.2.2  Instrumental variable analysis
Next, we use the Instrumental Variable approach to address the potential issue. Following 
previous studies of theoretical and empirical work in the law, institution, and finance litera-
ture (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2001; Beck et al. 2003), the latitude of the country is selected as 
our exogenous variable.
The endowment theory suggests that the initial endowment and geographical environ-
ment shape the construction of institution and policies, which can be used to explain the 
cross-country variations in financial intermediary and financial institution development (La 
Porta et al. 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2001; Beck et al. 2003). Therefore, the location tends 
to affect the bank regulation and supervision framework in different countries, but it is 
less likely to affect directly banks’ systemic risk. Therefore, we use Latitude, which is the 
absolute value of the latitude of the country and normalized to take value between 0 and 1, 
as instrumental variable for causal inference.6 We employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
model to conduct the instrumental variable analysis, and the results are reported in Table 5.
In panel A, we present the first stage results of the two-stage least squares regressions. 
We find that the instrumental variable, Latitude, is significantly and negatively related to 
regulation variables (except for Activity Restrictions), suggesting that the historical endow-
ments can affect the regulation and supervision framework in different countries. Previous 
studies suggest that countries located in high latitude area are richer and less intervention-
ist, therefore the regulation and supervision in banking of these countries tend to be less 
restrict (La Porta et al. 1999). The results of F-test also suggest that the instrumental vari-
ables are valid in our first stage estimation.
In panel B, we report the second stage results by using the predicted value of regula-
tion variables from the first-step regressions. We find that the coefficient of all our regula-
tion variables are all positively and significantly related to systemic risk. Overall, our main 
empirical findings are robust to the instrumental variable regression analyses.
3.3  Robustness test
In this section, we conduct a series of additional regression analyses to verify the robust-
ness of our main results. As mentioned in Sect. 2.1, the countries included in our sample 
are based on data availability. As a result, there might be concerns with our baseline results 
because of the existence of unbalanced observations cross countries. Therefore, we firstly 
run the analysis for Eq. (3) by employing the weighted-least-square regression to address 
the issue of unbalanced panel data. We take the inverse of the number of the observations 
for a country as the weight for each bank in the country so that each country receives the 
6 Similar approach has been used in previous studies for estimating impact of bank regulation and supervi-
sion (e.g., Barth et al., 2009, 2013b; Beck et al., 2006; Houston et al., 2011).
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equal weight in the estimation. The results are reported in Table  6. Consistent with our 
main regression results presented in Sect.  3.1, the relationship between the majority of 
regulation variables and systemic risk are positive and significant, showing that our main 
findings are robust and are less likely to be biased due to unbalanced observation cross 
countries.
Second, regressions are run to test the relationship between systemic risk and the five 
variables of bank regulation and supervision based on two subsamples. For the first sub-
sample, we exclude countries with less than 10 observations in each year, and the results 
are shown in the left side of Table 6. The total observations of Japan account for around 
13.88% of the full sample and the predominance of the banks in Japan may bias our results. 
So we run the regressions after dropping banks in Japan from our sample. Results of 
regression analyses with the subsample of excluding Japan are presented in the right side 
Table 6  Robustness test: WLS regression
This table reports the WLS regression results of the estimation of different regulations and systemic risk 
from 65 countries for the period from 2001 to 2013. The weight is the inverse of the number of observa-
tions for a country. The dependent variable is the systemic risk measure by MES. Control variables include 
MTBV, lgTA, LLP, ROAA, GDP Growth Inflation and Economic Freedom. Detailed definitions of the vari-
ables can be found in “Appendix 1”. Bank fixed effect and year fixed effects are both included. The standard 
errors for the regressions are estimated as heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks and 
are presented in brackets *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% signifi-
cance level, respectively
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Activity restriction Initial capital 
stringency
Prompt cor-
rective action
Depositor Regulation total
Regulation 0.410*** 0.551*** 0.433*** − 0.084 0.766***
(0.111) (0.100) (0.096) (0.080) (0.129)
MTBV 0.042 0.047 0.050 0.044 0.049
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
lgTA − 0.154** − 0.149** − 0.133** − 0.188*** − 0.103*
(0.060) (0.058) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060)
LLP − 0.010 − 0.011* − 0.010 − 0.011 − 0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
ROAA 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
GDP growth 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Inflation − 0.004 − 0.003 − 0.003 − 0.005 − 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Economic freedom 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.008
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
_cons 1.875** 1.586** 1.559** 2.405*** 1.144
(0.749) (0.714) (0.732) (0.726) (0.741)
Bank-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6305 6305 6305 6305 6305
Adj. R-sq 0.352 0.355 0.353 0.349 0.356
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Table 7  Robustness test: subsamples
This table presents the results of regression analyses of the relationship between systemic risk and regulations by using the subsample: (a) without countries less than 10 
observations in each year; (b) the subsample excluded observations of Japan since it counts around 13.88% of the full sample. Detailed definitions of the variables can be 
found in “Appendix 1”. Bank fixed effect and year fixed effects are both included. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated as heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered for banks and are presented in brackets. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively
Without countries less than 10 observations per year Without Japan
Activity restric-
tion
Initial capital 
stringency
Prompt correc-
tive action
Deposit insurer 
power
Regulation total Activity restric-
tion
Initial capital 
stringency
Prompt correc-
tive action
Deposit insurer 
power
Regulation total
Regulation 0.288** 0.652*** 0.328*** − 0.074 0.706*** 0.249*** 0.317*** 0.241*** − 0.088 0.445***
(0.114) (0.112) (0.095) (0.071) (0.134) (0.090) (0.083) (0.079) (0.061) (0.105)
MTBV 0.047 0.052* 0.058* 0.047 0.057* 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.096*** 0.090*** 0.096***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
lgTA − 0.188*** − 0.195*** − 0.168*** − 0.215*** − 0.140** − 0.066 − 0.084* − 0.067 − 0.092** − 0.050
(0.064) (0.061) (0.065) (0.063) (0.063) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
LLP − 0.009 − 0.010 − 0.009 − 0.009 − 0.009 − 0.009* − 0.009* − 0.009 − 0.009 − 0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
ROAA − 0.005 − 0.005 − 0.006 − 0.006 − 0.006 − 0.006 − 0.006 − 0.006 − 0.007 − 0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
GDP growth 0.010 0.007 0.013* 0.009 0.013 0.008** 0.006* 0.008** 0.007** 0.008**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Inflation − 0.004 − 0.005 − 0.003 − 0.005 − 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Economic 
freedom
0.025*** 0.023*** 0.022** 0.022** 0.026*** 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.006
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
_cons 0.906 0.826 0.744 1.396* 0.211 0.892 1.111* 0.811 1.289** 0.624
(0.768) (0.734) (0.751) (0.750) (0.750) (0.648) (0.634) (0.649) (0.637) (0.646)
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4391 4391 4391 4391 4391 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430
Adj. R-sq 0.278 0.285 0.279 0.276 0.283 0.234 0.235 0.234 0.232 0.236
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Table 8  Robustness test: alternative measure of country-level governance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Activity 
restriction
Initial capital 
stringency
Prompt 
corrective 
action
Deposit 
insurer power
Regulation 
total
Activity 
restriction
Initial 
capital 
stringency
Prompt 
corrective 
action
Deposit 
insurer power
Regulation total
Regulation 0.193** 0.377*** 0.189** − 0.092 0.410*** 0.267*** 0.352*** 0.195** − 0.095 0.454***
(0.090) (0.080) (0.077) (0.062) (0.105) (0.091) (0.079) (0.076) (0.062) (0.104)
MTBV 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.075*** 0.070*** 0.075*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.063*** 0.068***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
lgTA − 0.113*** − 0.111*** − 0.111*** − 0.129*** − 0.094** − 0.083* − 0.091** − 0.088** − 0.106** − 0.066
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043)
LLP − 0.010* − 0.010* − 0.010* − 0.010* − 0.010* − 0.009* − 0.010* − 0.009 − 0.010* − 0.009*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
ROAA − 0.003 − 0.003 − 0.003 − 0.003 − 0.003 − 0.004 − 0.003 − 0.004 − 0.004 − 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
GDP growth 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Inflation − 0.001 − 0.000 − 0.001 − 0.001 − 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 − 0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Control of 
corruption
0.248** 0.286*** 0.234** 0.250** 0.249**
(0.104) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.104)
Overall 
governance 
index
0.826*** 0.747*** 0.756*** 0.761*** 0.805***
(0.158) (0.153) (0.156) (0.154) (0.156)
_cons 1.538*** 1.348*** 1.435*** 1.719*** 1.261*** 0.891** 0.903** 0.898** 1.203*** 0.651
(0.389) (0.382) (0.393) (0.385) (0.390) (0.407) (0.400) (0.407) (0.399) (0.408)
Time fixed 
effect
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed 
effect
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 8  (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Activity 
restriction
Initial capital 
stringency
Prompt 
corrective 
action
Deposit 
insurer power
Regulation 
total
Activity 
restriction
Initial 
capital 
stringency
Prompt 
corrective 
action
Deposit 
insurer power
Regulation total
N 6305 6305 6305 6305 6305 6305 6305 6305 6305 6305
Adj. R-sq 0.268 0.271 0.268 0.268 0.270 0.273 0.275 0.273 0.272 0.275
This table reports the results of regression analyses of the relationship between systemic risk and regulations by using alternative country-level governance variables. In col-
umn (1)–(5), we use the control of corruption as the governance index. In column (6)–(10), we use the overall governance index of six country-level governance indicators, 
including voice and accountability, political stability, governance effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Detailed definitions of the variables 
can be found in “Appendix 1”. Bank fixed effect and year fixed effects are both included. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated as heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors clustered for banks and are presented in brackets. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively
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of Table 7. All regressions include year and bank fixed effects. Our main findings still hold 
for both subsamples.
Third, previous studies suggest that a nation’s level of corruption can affect banks’ 
lending behaviour (Barth et  al. 2009; Houston et  al. 2011). Therefore, we add two 
additional variables of country-level institutional quality as an explanatory variable 
to check the robustness of our results. Considering the high correlation between eco-
nomic freedom index and the governance indicator (Delis et al. 2011), we remove the 
economic freedom from the models when running the regression analyses with institu-
tional quality indices.
The first variable of institutional quality we use is the Control of Corruption, which 
measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gains. Higher value of 
this measure indicates a better control of corruption. We also include an overall governance 
index that measures the overall political and institutional quality of a country. The overall 
governance index captures six dimensions of a nation’s governance, including Governance 
effectiveness, Political stability, Regulatory Quality, Rule of law, Voice and accountability, 
as well as Control of corruption. Higher value of this index indicates a better institutional 
environment in a country. The data are derived from the World Bank World Governance 
Indicator database. The results are reported in Table 8.
We observe a positive and significant relationship between the governance index and 
systemic risk. A business environment with better control of corruption and governance, 
as well as more economic freedom, would allow banks to interact with the real economies 
in a more transparent and organized manner, which in turn increases the interconnected-
ness of the whole banking system. This increased interconnectedness improves the finan-
cial market development, but at the same time increases the potential systemic risk when 
financial markets collapse (Allen et  al. 2012; Acemoglu et  al. 2015). Overall, our main 
findings remain unchanged, showing that regulation variables are significantly and posi-
tively related to systemic risk.
Last, we employ an alternative measure of systemic risk, namely SRISK, to assess the 
relationship between bank regulation and systemic risk. Brownlees and Engle (2017) intro-
duce SRISK to measure an individual financial institution’s contribution to the systemic 
risk, which has been widely used by subsequent studies (e.g., Iqbal and Vähämaa 2019; 
Jouida 2019). SRISK is concerned with the capital shortfall of a firm conditional on a 
severe market decline, and is a function of its size, leverage and risk. Specifically, SRISK 
measures how much capital the financial institution would need in a crisis time to maintain 
a given capital-to-assets ratio. The measure can readily be computed using balance sheet 
information and an appropriate Long Run Marginal Expected Shortfall (LRMES) estimator. 
Following previous studies such as Brownlees and Engle (2017) and Berger et al. (2019), 
we measure SRISK based on the following equation:
where k is the capital requirement, and we set k=8% in this research. LRMESi,t is the long-
run marginal expected shortfall at time t for bank i , defined as the decline in equity values 
conditional on a financial crisis. Higher value of SRISK indicates greater contribution of 
systemic risk.
(5)
SRISKi,t = Et−1(Capital Shortfalli|Crisis)
= Et−1
(
k
(
Debti + Equityi
)
− Equityi|Crisis
)
= kDebti,t−1 − (1 − k)
(
1 − LRMESi,t
)
Equityi,t
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Table 9  Alternative measure of systemic risk: SRISK
This table reports the panel regression results of the estimation of different regulations and systemic risk measured by SRISK from 65 countries for the period from 2001 to 2013. 
The dependent variable is the systemic risk measure by MES. Control variables include MTBV, lgTA, LLP, ROAA, GDP Growth Inflation and Economic Freedom. Detailed defini-
tions of the variables can be found in “Appendix 1”. Bank fixed effect and year fixed effects are both included. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated as heteroskedas-
ticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks and are presented in brackets *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Activity restriction Initial capital stringency Prompt corrective 
action
Deposit insurer power Regulation total
Regulation 0.581*** 0.279*** 0.212* − 0.239* 0.561***
(0.205) (0.098) (0.114) (0.130) (0.196)
MTBV − 0.044 − 0.047 − 0.045 − 0.051 − 0.040
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.040)
lgTA − 0.152 − 0.213 − 0.193 − 0.222 − 0.159
(0.149) (0.150) (0.154) (0.151) (0.154)
LLP − 0.037 − 0.036 − 0.035 − 0.036 − 0.036
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
ROAA − 0.025*** − 0.025*** − 0.025*** − 0.025*** − 0.025***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
GDP growth − 0.007 − 0.010* − 0.008 − 0.009 − 0.008
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Inflation 0.012* 0.011* 0.012* 0.011 0.013*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Economic freedom − 0.026*** − 0.033*** − 0.032*** − 0.033*** − 0.029***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
_cons 2.600 3.618* 3.388* 3.903** 2.788
(1.847) (1.887) (1.949) (1.913) (1.940)
Bank-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5510 5510 5510 5510 5510
Adj. R-sq 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
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Table 10  Heterogeneity effects
This table reports the panel regression results of the estimation of different regulations and systemic risk 
measure by MES. In Panel A, we introduce the interaction between the bank regulation stringency and 
Equity-to-Assets ratio. In Panel B, we introduce the interaction between the bank regulations and bank 
diversification. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated as heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered for banks and are presented in brackets. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Activity restriction Initial 
capital 
stringency
Prompt 
corrective 
action
Deposit insurer 
power
Regulation total
Panel A
Regulation 0.292*** 0.564*** 0.424*** − 0.045 0.705***
(0.110) (0.119) (0.110) (0.087) (0.133)
Regula-
tion × equity/
assets
− 0.008 − 0.018** − 0.019*** − 0.004 − 0.024***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Equity/assets 0.005 0.010* 0.014** 0.001 0.013***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
_cons 1.226* 1.129* 1.102* 1.594** 0.850
(0.671) (0.660) (0.661) (0.657) (0.668)
Other control vari-
ables
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6305 6305 6305 6305 6305
Adj. R-sq 0.268 0.271 0.270 0.267 0.271
Panel B
Regulation 0.206** 0.356*** 0.273*** − 0.108* 0.529***
(0.100) (0.108) (0.079) (0.064) (0.123)
Regulation * diver-
sification
− 0.014 0.017 − 0.180*** 0.045 − 0.273*
(0.107) (0.204) (0.047) (0.053) (0.163)
Diversification 0.021 0.012 0.192*** − 0.003 0.160*
(0.030) (0.069) (0.047) (0.023) (0.087)
_cons 1.371** 1.358** 1.239** 1.672*** 1.018*
(0.598) (0.588) (0.590) (0.588) (0.596)
Other control vari-
ables
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6305 6305 6305 6305 6305
Adj. R-sq 0.267 0.270 0.269 0.266 0.270
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We run the baseline regression by using SRISK as the systemic risk measure. The 
results are reported in Table 9. Overall, the results are consistent with the main results. We 
find that the coefficients for Activity Restriction, Initial Capital Stringency, Prompt Cor-
rective Action and Total Regulation Index are still significantly positive, suggesting that the 
stringency of regulation and supervision have a positive impact on banks’ systemic risk as 
measured by SRISK.
3.4  Heterogeneity effects
In previous sections, we present results of our main regression analyses and robustness 
tests, showing that stringent regulation and supervision can increase systemic risk through 
greater capital shortfall. In this section, we conduct further empirical tests to support our 
arguments by looking at two interaction terms.
First, if the increase in banks’ systemic risk is due to their greater capital shortfall, we 
would expect that such an impact is likely to be alleviated for banks which hold more capi-
tal as capital can absorb the potential loss and thereby reduce capital shortfall. To validate 
this hypothesis, we introduce the interaction between regulatory variables and Equity-to-
Assets ratio. The results are presented in Panel A of Table 10.
Overall, we observe that the interaction terms are significant and negative for the 
interaction between Equity-to-Assets and Initial Capital Stringency/Prompt Corrective 
Action/Total Regulation Index, indicating that the positive impact of regulation on systemic 
risk will be reduced if banks hold more capital. These results support our assumption that 
bank regulation increases systemic risk through banks having greater capital shortfall.
Second, if the capital shortfall is the channel through which regulation and supervision 
increase systemic risk, we would expect that diversification of banks can alleviate such 
impact. First, based on the portfolio theory, the combined cash flows from non-correlated 
revenue sources should be more stable than the constituent parts (Baele et  al. 2007). If 
banks can maintain stable income flows, the likelihood of suffering capital shortage will 
be lower. In addition, diversification also provides more choices for banks to raise capi-
tal. In other words, banks who succeed in diversifying their business lines tend to have 
more channels to raise capital when they meet capital shortage, and thereby tend to be safer 
compared to their counterparts who rely on onefold source. We then introduce the interac-
tion between regulatory variables and Diversification which is measured by non-interest 
income divided by total operating income. If our argument holds true, we would expect a 
negative relationship between the interaction term and the dependent variable in the regres-
sion models. Panel B of Table 10 shows the results of this heterogeneity test. We observe 
that the coefficients of interaction terms are negative and significant in columns (3) and 
(5). These results suggest that the positive influence of regulation and supervision on sys-
temic risk can be alleviated for better diversified banks, which is consistent with our earlier 
expectation. Overall, our heterogeneity tests provide further evidence to support our main 
argument that stringent regulation and supervision can increase systemic risk and such an 
impact is likely to occur through intensified capital shortfall.
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4  Conclusions
There has been increasing interest in academic research on bank regulation and supervision 
since the financial crisis of 2007–2009. However, the theoretical debates on whether bank 
regulation and supervision can help to maintain financial stability remain open due to lim-
ited evidence on the relationship between bank regulation and systemic risk. Hoque et al. 
(2015) argue that the correlation in the risk-taking behavior of banks is much more relevant 
than the absolute level of risk that individual banks take. The paper aims to investigate how 
some specific types of bank regulation and supervision affect individual banks’ systemic 
risk across countries. Based on a new database developed by Barth et al. (2013a), we pro-
vide robust evidence on the impact of bank activity restriction, capital requirements, offi-
cial supervision and deposit insurance on systemic risk in 65 countries during the period 
2001–2013. We also develop a Total Regulation Index based on the four specific regulation 
variables in order to examine the combined effect of regulatory and supervisory policies.
We find that more stringent regulation and supervision lead to higher systemic risk. 
Specifically, countries with more restrictions on bank activities, higher initial capital strin-
gency or stronger prompt correction power tend to suffer from higher systemic risk. We 
also find that the Total Regulation Index is positively related to the systemic index measure, 
confirming that increased systemic risk is more likely to happen in a stringent regulatory 
and supervisory environment. This is consistent with our expectation based on the view 
that systemic risk can be defined as the capital shortfall of a financial institution condi-
tional on a severe market decline (Brownlees and Engle 2017; Acharya et al. 2017) and a 
bank is more likely to have capital shortfall when it is in an environment with more strin-
gent regulation. To address the potential endogeneity issue, we employ Basel II staggered 
implementation across countries as exogenous event and use latitude for Instrument Varia-
ble analysis. Our findings appear to be robust after employing WLS to control the potential 
effect of unbalanced panel data, regressing on subsamples, using variables of a country’s 
institutional quality indexes and alternative systemic risk measure. We also provide further 
evidence through examining interaction effects. By interacting regulatory variables with 
equity-to-asset ratio and diversification, we find the positive impact of bank regulation and 
supervision on systemic risk would be alleviated if the bank holds more capital and has a 
diversified income flow.
Our findings contribute to the limited understanding of the association between bank 
regulation and systemic stability, and have important implications for governments and 
regulators. Since the financial crisis of 2007–2009, we have seen a growing awareness of 
the need for a macroprudential approach to regulation (Arnold et al. 2012). Governments 
in different countries have introduced a variety of regulatory and supervisory polices to 
regulate the banking industry and manage the financial cycle. However, these stringent 
regulations have potential drawbacks. They may indeed decrease banks’ standalone risks 
but fail to look at the correlated risks they take. Our findings show that, opposite to what 
governments and regulators have expected, stringent regulatory and supervisory policies 
result in less systemic stability, although such effect could be alleviated by the banks hav-
ing a greater level of equity.
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Our paper has important implications for policy makers. Despite the significant pol-
icy reforms introduced after the financial crisis, there have been increasing concerns on 
whether regulatory mechanisms designed according to stringent regulatory and supervisory 
policies, such as activity restrictions, based only on the perspective of individual bank risk, 
are effective in reducing the probability of systemic crises. Indeed, the “utopian” objective 
function of policy makers, that it, to maximize the expected value of a constrained social 
welfare function (Kane 1980, p. 199), has been long questioned due to influence of politic 
forces. Kane (1980) argues that effective policy control has three elements: policy instru-
ments, intermediate policy targets and policy goals. In order to achieve long term policy 
goals, it is important for policy makers to have appropriate intermediate policy targets that 
can be tracked closely and are based on theoretical and empirical predictions. In this sense, 
timely empirical studies on the impact of bank regulation and systemic risk is in dire need. 
Our findings suggest that the currently designed tight regulation appears to have effects 
opposite to the expectations of governments. In order to sustain the stability of banking, 
regulatory and supervisory mechanisms should be designed based on inter-bank correla-
tion. This is consistent with other researchers’ call for prudential regulation that operates at 
a collective level (e.g., Acharya 2009).
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Table 11  Definition of variables
Variable name Description
MES Average return on sample banks conditioned on 5% worse returns on the market
Activity restriction A measure of a bank’s ability to conduct activities in the business area of 
securities underwriting, insurance, and real estate. A value of 1–4 is added 
if an activity is (1) “unrestricted” and coded as a score of 1 if a full range of 
activities can be conducted directly; (2) “permitted” and coded as a score of 
2 if the full range of activities can be conducted, but some or all must be con-
ducted in subsidiaries; (3) “restricted” and counted as a score of 3 if less than 
a full range of activities can be conducted in a bank or subsidiaries; and (4) 
“prohibited” and counted as a score of 4 if the activity cannot be conducted 
in either the bank or subsidiaries. Activity restriction is calculated by adding 
the answers to these questions together then divided by 12. Greater values 
indicate more restrictions (Barth et al. 2004, 2013b)
Initial capital stringency A variable used to measure whether regulatory capital in a country can include 
assets other than cash or government securities and borrowed funds and 
whether the sources of capital is verified by the regulatory supervisory 
authorities. It is an index based on the following question (for question (1), 
Yes = 1 No = 0; for question (2) and (3), Yes = 0 No = 1): (1) Are the sources 
of funds to be used as capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory authori-
ties? (2) Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be 
performed with assets other than cash or government securities? (3) Can the 
initial disbursement of capital be performed with borrowed funds? We then 
add answers to these questions together and divide it by 3 to calculate the ini-
tial capital stringency index. Higher values indicate greater stringency (Barth 
et al. 2004, 2013b)
Prompt corrective action A variable that measures whether supervisors in a country have the requisite 
and suitable powers to force automatic enforcement actions based on pre-
determined levels of bank solvency deterioration. It is constructed based on 
the following questions (Yes = 1, No = 0): (1) Can the supervisory authority 
force a bank to change its internal organizational structure? (2) Are there any 
mechanisms of cease and desist-type orders, whose infraction leads to the 
automatic imposition of civil and penal sanctions against the bank’s directors 
and managers? (3) Can the supervisory agency order the bank’s directors 
or management to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses? 
(4) Can the supervisory agency suspend the director’s decision to distribute 
dividends? (5) Can the supervisory agency suspend the director’s decision 
to distribute bonuses? (6) Can the supervisory agency suspend the director’s 
decision to distribute management fees? Prompt corrective action is calculated 
as the sum of the score counted for each question and divided by 6. A higher 
value indicates greater supervisory power (Barth et al. 2004, 2013b)
Deposit insurer power The deposit insurer power scheme is an index that measures each country’s 
deposit insurance regime and evolution from 1999 to 2011. This index is 
based on the answer to the following questions (Yes = 1, No = 0): (1) Does 
the deposit insurance authority make the decision to intervene in a bank? 
(2)Can the deposit insurance agency/fund take legal action for violations of 
laws, regulations, and bylaws (of the deposit insurance agency) against bank 
directors or other bank officials? (3)Has the deposit insurance agency/fund 
ever taken legal action for violations of laws, regulations, and bylaws (of 
the deposit insurance agency) against bank directors or other bank officials? 
(4)Were any deposits not explicitly covered by the deposit insurance at 
the time of the failure compensated when the bank failed (excluding funds 
later paid out in liquidation procedures)? Deposit insurer power is equal to 
{[(1) + (2) + (3)]/3 + (4)}/2. This variable ranges from 0 to 1, where higher 
values indicate more power (Barth et al. 2004, 2013b)
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Appendix 2
See Tables 12.
Table 11  (continued)
Variable name Description
Total regulation A single measure of bank regulation that is constructed using factor analysis 
based on the four regulation measures. The following equation is employed: 
 Yi,s,t = βi  Regulations,s,t + εi,t, where the subscripts i, s, and t refer denote for 
countries, the four regulation variables and years, respectively. Yi,s,t is the 
value of four regulation measures, Regulation is the observation on the com-
mon factor, and   is the factor loadings. Next, we normalize variable Yi,s,t, to 
have a mean of zero and a variance of one. Following the Eq. (1), we estimate 
the factors ( Regulationist ) and their loadingsi . The results shows that around 
55% of variance for the variable are explained by the common factors. We use 
the factor with greatest explanatory power as our measure of total regulation, 
where larger value indicates greater stringency
LgTA A natural logarithm of total assets denominated in US dollars
ROAA Return on average asset. Net income/total assets in %
MTBV Market-to-book value, measured as market value of equity/Book value of equity
LLP Loan loss provision ratio, measured as total loan loss provision/net loan in %
GDP growth The log value of annual growth rate of GDP
Inflation The percentage change of GDP deflator
Basel II Dummy A dummy variable which equals to one for the time after the country adopted 
Basel II and 0 otherwise
SRISK An individual financial institution’s contribution to the systemic risk, measured 
in billion dollar value
Economic freedom Proxy for the overall level of economic freedom from Heritage Foundation. It is 
a composite index that including business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal free-
dom, government spending, monetary freedom, investment freedom, financial 
freedom. property rights, labour freedom
Equity/assets Total equity to total assets ratio
Diversification Non-interest income divided by total operating income in %
Latitude The absolute value of the latitude of the country and normalized to take value 
between 0 and 1
Control of corruption The perception of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption. As well as "capture" 
of the state by elites and private interests. Higher value indicates a better 
control of corruption (Data source: World Bank World Governance Indicator 
database)
Overall governance index The overall political and institutional quality of a country, measured as the arith-
metic average of six indicators, including Governance effectiveness, Political 
stability, Regulatory Quality, Rule of law, Voice and accountability, as well as 
Control of corruption. Higher value of this index indicates a better institu-
tional environment (Data source: World Bank World Governance Indicator 
database)
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Table 12  Robustness test: includes US and UK banks
This table reports the panel regression results of the estimation of different regulations and systemic risk from 67 countries, including US and UK banks for the period from 2001 to 2013. 
The dependent variable is the systemic risk measure by MES. Control variables include MTBV, lgTA, LLP, ROAA, GDP Growth, Inflation and Economic Freedom. Detailed definitions 
of the variables can be found in “Appendix 1 of Table 11”. Bank fixed effect and year fixed effects are both included. The standard errors for the regressions are estimated as heteroske-
dasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks and are presented in brackets *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Activity restriction Initial capital stringency Prompt corrective action Deposit insurer power Regulation total
Regulation 0.843*** 1.027*** 0.696*** − 0.024 0.200***
(0.109) (0.096) (0.094) (0.050) (0.022)
MTBV 0.143** 0.142** 0.146** 0.146** 0.145**
(0.070) (0.069) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
lgTA − 0.151** − 0.227*** − 0.142** − 0.180*** − 0.082
(0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.068) (0.067)
LLP − 0.007 − 0.009 − 0.008 − 0.008 − 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
ROA − 0.025*** − 0.023*** − 0.026*** − 0.026*** − 0.027***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
GDP growth 0.059*** 0.054*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.057***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Inflation 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Economic freedom − 0.000 − 0.016** − 0.002 0.000 0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
_cons 1.289 2.961*** 1.162 1.909** 0.287
(0.839) (0.829) (0.842) (0.922) (0.858)
Bank-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9559 9559 9559 9559 9559
Adj. R-sq 0.089 0.094 0.088 0.084 0.091
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